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The Flame of Eternity is Krzysztof Michalski’s provocative, passionate, and at times poetic med-
itation on the eternal in Nietzsche’s writings.  While the subject of the book is the concept of 
eternity, it quickly becomes clear that this concept is inextricably bound up with that of change 
and temporality.  Change is everywhere, and thus cannot be separated from identity, con-
sciousness, knowledge, happiness, morality, and so forth.  Michalski adroitly juxtaposes Nie-
tzsche’s understanding of change with more traditional concepts, especially those which draw 
on Cartesian dualism.  Insofar as consciousness cannot be abstracted or removed from its liv-
ing conditions, its identity is best described as whatever happens to it in the course of its ongo-
ing changes and permutations: “The assumption that things—some, at least—simply are, that 
they do not merely become what they are, is yet another illusion concealed within the Carte-
sian thesis.” (33)  There is nothing which exists apart from its own becoming, from its perpet-
ual transition into something else.  The claim here is much more interesting than a simple de-
scription of how we humans invariably experience the world.  If taken seriously, it implies 
that the idea of a world or universe that undergoes change, as if the world were a changing 
thing, is itself a deeply misguided notion.  Michalski argues, quite convincingly, that there is 
neither a beginning nor an end to becoming: “If the world that I am looking at, the world 
where I live, is really changing… then that passing, that change, that becoming, never began 
and will never end.” (96)  This argument, elaborated with the help of extensive quoting from 
Nietzsche, stipulates that it is the very experience of our changing finitude which proves the 
impossibility of an eternal substance or eternal truth anywhere in the world.  Conversely, if 
there were indeed something which resisted its own becoming, which was itself the complete 
actualization of permanence, then it would follow that everything around it would likewise 
come to a standstill, would fulfill its inner teleological truth as an unchanging substance.  The 
passage of time would be nothing more than pure illusion, for it is impossible that genuine 
change and genuine permanence coexist without one vanquishing the other: “If there does 
exist something that does not change, it is difficult to believe that anything changes, that time 
is real.” (94)  But since we all experience our own becoming directly and immediately, that is 
proof enough that we do not exist in a world destined for dialectical reconciliation. 
Michalski draws significant conclusions from this basic starting position, including the 
idea that “[l]ife as we live it is the only possible measure of value.” (10)  There is no frame of 
reference, that is to say, from which we could validate values or concepts apart from the life in 
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which they are lived.  Precisely for the reason given above—namely, that there is no substra-
tum anywhere in the world, or outside of the world, absorbing and assimilating all of the 
changes occurring within it—it is for this reason that we cannot ground our actions in a meta-
physical system of rationalized values.  There are no limits, no boundaries, to change.  Hence, 
neither can we speak of a totality of change, within which all change takes place: “There is no 
such thing as a totality that encompasses everything, a totality without remainder: the world is 
no such totality.” (47)  In this respect, differences proliferate endlessly, but if this is so then it is 
impossible to subordinate those differences to a common, universal, unchanging truth.  Thus, 
in Michalski’s interpretation of Nietzschean temporality and chance, there simply is no well-
ordered cosmos to which we could apply our speculative, totalizing rationality: “Nietzsche 
tells us: forget about eternity, which renders time a dream.  Set aside theories that persuade 
you to wake up, to tear off the veil of time, in order to face the world as it (ostensibly) is.  
These are just ruses, futile tricks.” (92)  It would be comforting to fully comprehend the mean-
ing of life, the teleology of the world, the eternal essence of things.  But since we ourselves 
constitute a part of that infinitely changing world, since life is unequivocally bound up with 
death, there is no escape to a cozy, relaxed place outside of time.  Although it would bring 
solace because death is tragic and horrifying and senseless, it would be no less mythical for all 
that.  At the same time, however, Michalski maintains a nuanced view of systematic values 
and knowledge.  He writes, from his own position as well as Nietzsche’s, that knowledge is 
only possible insofar as it borders on faith in its totalization.  It is meaningless without this 
assumption: “Knowledge strives toward an ultimate determination, it presupposes a claim to 
universal and unconditional validity, as well as to the possibility of satisfying that claim, the 
possibility that things are as it declares them to be.” (169)  If this were not the case, then we 
humans would have a difficult time indeed formulating our ideas in a coherent, meaningful 
manner.  Insofar as we defend our values in the course of living them out, we must defend 
them and live them paradoxically: they will never form an absolute basis for understanding 
the world, from a heavenly perspective, but we must nevertheless assume this kind of trajecto-
ry for them, without which we inexorably sink into nihilistic despair and disorientation. 
Nihilism is a recurring motif in The Flame of Eternity.  Michalski explores several of its 
overlapping dimensions, from the psychological to the epistemic, and ultimately contends that 
it is unavoidable.  But at the same time there are better and worse ways of approaching the 
problem.  As early as the preface, he writes that we cannot overcome nihilism once and for all, 
but that each moment of life provides us with an opportunity to break free from the con-
straints of continuity. (ix)  These constraints are inevitable insofar as a pragmatic outlook relies 
upon a certain epistemic orientation, as already mentioned, but it is always possible to rein-
vent them in accordance with new values and new systems of truth.  This concrete possibility 
therefore points to a crucial distinction within nihilism: there is the sickness of life associated 
with all of our attempts to control what is uncontrollable; and there is the sickness of life that 
rejects the tension intrinsic to the first form of sickness.  The first type affirms the possibility of 
a liberating revaluation of values, whereas the second does not: “Thus while the project of tra-
ditional values, or nihilism, is a negation of our life as it is, the revaluation of all values is not an 
affirmation of life as it is.  Life finds no values, no order independent of it, to which it could 
correspond or not; it creates its own values.” (10)  Since there is no justification for values out-
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side of life, the attempt to reconsolidate them from an all-encompassing, ideal perspective 
constitutes a form of nihilism sick with itself, sick with the never-ending tensions of life that 
plague every human being.  But these tensions, which have their source in a nihilistic tenden-
cy, can serve as the catalyst for Nietzschean self-overcoming, that is to say, the creation of new 
standards and new morals.  There is no liberation without sickness, without nihilism, for the 
fundamental reason that self-overcoming is the overcoming of sickness and nihilism.  In con-
trast to the last man, who seeks a reasonable, peaceful way of life, the overman risks every-
thing, all of his life and all of his values, because life is this overflowing and overcoming—it is 
conflict, war, perpetual change, and the overcoming of itself whether we resist it or embrace it: 
“To love life then means, as Zarathustra tells us, to be prepared to cast off every form, every 
situation, in which I may find myself.  Not to cling to life as I know it, tightly, at all costs, try-
ing merely to cleanse it of everything that is uncomfortable, painful, dark, and unexpected.” 
(161) 
Michalski’s reading of self-overcoming and the affirmation of life cannot be separated 
from his analysis of Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same.  He distinguishes it, in light of Zar-
athustra’s interactions with the dwarf in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, from the mere repetition of a 
moment in time which takes place in a delimited fashion.  Time does not proceed according to 
a series of units or segments, nor is it something we perceive externally as if it were a specta-
cle.  That was the dwarf’s mistake.  In that case time disappears as the future, as well as the 
past, is abstracted from my experience of the present.  There is a unity of time that can be af-
firmed in its ceaseless becoming, whereby the past and the future determine different aspects 
of every moment in its totality, in its unity of passing and becoming. (185)  Because everything 
is unlimited change, we experience it directly and immediately in its perpetual becoming, 
without being able to subordinate it to our ideals of mechanistic temporality.  Because the 
moment is therefore open to change, open to the unity of past and future, Michalski makes the 
case that this experience of time includes, as a fundamental aspect, the experience of eternity: 
“Understood in this way, eternity is not the opposite of time but its aspect, its necessary di-
mension.  Its horizon.  Necessary, because without it time—the difference between past and 
future, and thus accordingly of passing and becoming—would be impossible.” (186)  Time 
would be impossible without the eternal aspect of becoming since the past, present, and future 
would be perceived as abstract, intellectual categories.  They would belong to the realm of 
spectacle.  And this frame of reference is the same one Michalski ascribes to the last man, since 
it is the last man who treats life as either a piece of entertainment, i.e., a spectacle or a simula-
crum, or as a mode of abstract knowledge, something objective that he analyzes.   
We might then ask, in a critical fashion, whether the distinction between the last man 
and the overman is viable.  It is the last man, as Michalski argues, who rejects the primordial 
ambivalence of life, who rejects the inevitably tragic aspects of temporality: “It is precisely this 
other, dark side of human life—life as a constant effort to move out beyond every form it has 
attained, life as ceaseless and unlimited risk—it is precisely this fundamental nature of human 
life that the ideal of the last man tries to conceal, cover up, and negate.” (161)  This seems like a 
plausible characterization, and it is certainly in keeping with Nietzsche’s distinction between 
the last man and the overman.  But how is it conceivable that the last man represses unlimited 
risk or the becoming of life?  These are broad terms, and thus it is difficult to know what 
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Michalski has in mind when he speaks of affirming change, negating life, or covering up the 
darkness within ourselves.  How do we do any of this when life has already been defined as 
limitless risk and becoming?  Once we acknowledge that the mystery of life, its darkness and 
its illness, is infinitely boundless, it is difficult to claim that one version of values—that of the 
last man—represses or negates this boundlessness more than another.  Michalski is persuasive 
in his descriptions of darkness and recklessness in relation to life’s excess, to the way in which 
life perpetually overflows itself, but the eternal aspect of this overflowing suggests that our 
distinctions between the last man and the overman are highly problematic.  If we were able to 
measure and compare these distinctions in relation to infinite, perpetual becoming, whether 
quantitatively or qualitatively, there would be no difficulty.  But to the extent that we are una-
ble to affirm the eternal aspect of our lives to a greater or lesser degree than others, it may be 
equally impossible to categorize different kinds of willing as more or less open to the tragedy 
of time so eloquently described in Michalski’s Flame of Eternity. 
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